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Summary 
In 1990, the US adopted the OPA 90 in response to the Exxon Valdez grounding outside 
the Alaskan coast in 1989. The OPA 90 was the first legislation demanding double hull 
on oil tankers in order to prevent the spillage of oil in case of a grounding or collision. 
The IMO adopted amendments to MARPOL 73/78 in 1992, which for example required 
all new tankers of 600 dwt and above to have double sides or double bottom and tankers 
of 5,000 dwt and above to have both double bottom and double sides.  
 
The Erika accident outside the French coast shook the EU and a stricter regulation, in 
comparison with the MARPOL, on double hull tankers was adopted. The Prestige 
accident in 2002 further spurred the EU to put pressure on the IMO to implement the 
same accelerated phase out scheme of single hulled tankers as the EU had already 
adopted. This developed into a battle between the EU and the IMO on the jurisdictional 
right to prevent marine pollution by phasing out single hulled tankers.  
 
The thesis is a descriptive and analytical study of the development of the MARPOL and 
EU phase out schemes. By presenting the relevant UNCLOS articles it is analyzed how 
unilateral legislation may prevent single hulled tankers by using the jurisdiction of flag, 
port, and coastal states. The EU has taken an independent initiative to regulate the phase 
out stricter than the IMO and chapter 2 examines the jurisdiction of the EU in the field of 
maritime pollution prevention. The study shows that the EU member states may, by using 
their flag and port state jurisdiction given to them by the UNCLOS, implement the EU 
regulation. 
 
Chapter 3 describes how the MARPOL and EU schemes on the phasing out of single 
hulled tankers developed. These schemes came about during a process lasting a decade 
when both organizations wanted to prove their efficiency to respond quickly to the 
problems of oil pollution. Finally, the EU, after political pressure from the EU member 
states and the public opinion, had the IMO adopting the same phase out scheme as the EU 
but with some exemptions. The shipping industry is vulnerable to unilateral legislation 
since shipping is an international business and EU politicians are not considered to be as 
competent in the maritime field as experts of the IMO. Therefore, the IMO needs to take 
the initiative back from the EU on all matters concerning marine legislation. 
 
The last chapter analyzes the possible consequences for the shipping industry due to the 
phasing out of single hulled tankers. The phase out require, among other things, new 
tonnage to be built and old tonnage to be scrapped. There are many consequences for the 
shipping industry when new legislation is made and some of them may be very costly for 
some of the actors in the shipping industry. 
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Abbreviations 
13F  Regulation 13F of Annex I of MARPOL 73/78 
13G  Regulation 13G of Annex I of MARPOL 73/78 
13H  Regulation 13H of Annex I of MARPOL 73/78 
DWT  Dead Weight Tonnage 
EEZ  Exclusive Economic Zone 
EU  European Union 
HGO  Heavy Grade Oil 
IMCO  Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization 
IMO  International Maritime Organization 
INTERTANKO  International Association of Independent Tanker Owners 
ITOPF  Independent Tanker Owners Pollution Federation 
LC  Legal Committee 
LDT  Light Displacement Tonnage 
MARPOL  International Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution 
from Ships, 1973 as modified by the protocol of 1978 relating 
thereto 
MEPC  Marine Environment Protection Committee 
MSC  Maritime Safety Committee 
OILPOL  1954 London Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea 
by Oil 
OPA 90  United States Oil Pollution Act of 1990 
UK  United Kingdom 
ULCC  Ultra Large Crude Carrier 
UNCLOS  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
US  United States 
VLCC  Very Large Crude Carrier 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 General 
Shipping is perhaps the most international of all the world's great businesses. A ship may 
be registered in Liberia, owned by a shipping company in Norway, have a master from 
Croatia, have a crew from the Philippines, and sail between India and Brazil. At the same 
time, shipping is also one of the world’s most risky businesses. The best way to improve 
safety at sea is to develop international regulations that all shipping nations follow. Since 
the mid-1800s, adoptions of a number of such treaties and conventions have been made. 
Unfortunately, most treaties and conventions are not adopted until an accident occurs that 
prove the necessity for an international regulation. 
 
There is no other cargo that is shipped globally as much as oil and the trade of oil may 
impact most coast states. More than 2,000 million tonnes of crude oil and refined 
products were transported by sea in 1998, which in weight represented 40% of the total 
cargo shipped by sea.1 The crude oil is shipped from the main natural resources: from the 
Middle East/Gulf to Southeast Asia, Japan/South Korea, Europe and the United States 
(US); from North Africa to Europe; and from the Caribbean to the US. 
 
The largest importer of oil is the European Union (EU),2 which represents about 27% of 
the total world trade of crude oil whilst the US imports about 25% of the world total.3 
The annual demand of oil in the EU is around 640 million tonnes, but about 800 million 
tonnes is annually transported to, from, and between the EU ports.4 This is not including 
the domestic trade within individual states. About 70% of the tanker trade in the EU is 
focused on the Atlantic and northern coasts and 30% in the Mediterranean. The crude oil 
imported to the EU is mainly from the Middle East and North Africa and the trade routes 
are determined by port and refinery locations.  
 
The largest ports for oil within the EU are Rotterdam, which handles 100.8 million tonnes 
of crude oil annually, Marseilles, 48.3 tonnes, Le Havre, 37.0 tonnes, Trieste, 35.7 
tonnes, and Wilhelmshaven, 32.6 tonnes.5 This oil is transported on Very Large Crude 
                                                 
1 COM(2000) 142 final on the safety of the seaborne oil trade, p. 8. 
2 The EU member states are: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Denmark. Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malta, Poland, Portugal, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. 
3 COM(2000) 142 final on the safety of the seaborne oil trade, p. 8. 
4 Ibid.  
5 Ibid., p. 9. 
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Carriers6 (VLCC) or Ultra Large Crude Carriers7 (ULCC) routed around Africa or on 
“Suezmax” tankers8, which can pass through the Suez Canal. 
 
The world’s tanker fleet may roughly be divided into oil, crude, products, chemical, and 
liquid gas tankers. The oil tanker fleet is the largest in tonnage terms, the largest of all 
shipping sectors, and has the world’s largest ships. On January 1, 2004, the world oil 
tanker fleet consisted of 7 565 ships totalling 318 million dead weight tonnage (dwt9).10  
 
The Torrey Canyon, the Exxon Valdez, the Erika, and the Prestige were all accidents that 
proved the need for stricter regulations concerning oil tankers. The environmental 
damage on the marine and coastal environment caused by oil pollution was not realized 
until the Torrey Canyon accident in 1967. The following accidents made it further clear 
how important it was to legislate in order to prevent the same type of accidents. 
Therefore, the aftermath of these oil pollution catastrophes has been stricter legislation 
and a tougher attitude towards the oil companies and the tanker trade. 
 
This master thesis will focus on the development of one of the latest trends to avoid 
pollution from oil: the phasing out of single hulled tankers. The phasing out of single 
hulled tankers was first introduced by the US after the Exxon Valdez grounding in 1989 
through the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90). OPA 90 has been followed by actions 
taken by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the EU. The phasing out of 
single hulled tankers has been a controversial issue in the shipping industry since it is 
questioned how efficient a double hull is in comparison with a single hull in case of a 
grounding or collision. How efficient double hulled tankers will be to prevent pollution 
from oil will be seen in the future. 
 
1.2 Purpose 
The purpose of this master thesis is, firstly, to study the right of flag, port, and coastal 
states to ban ships from their area of jurisdiction. This is done by studying the jurisdiction 
of flag, port, and coastal states according to the United Nations Convention of the Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS). 11  
 
Secondly, the development of the IMO’s and the EU’s phase out schemes of single hulled 
tankers is reviewed. Traditionally, the EU has relied heavily on the IMO to legislate on 
                                                 
6 With a tonnage of +200 000 deadweight tonnage. 
7 With a tonnage of +300 000 deadweight tonnage. 
8 With a tonnage of 120 – 140 000 deadweight tonnage.  
9 Deadweight tonnage is essentially equal to the carrying capacity of a ship. It is the difference in weight 
between a ship loaded with stores and fuel and the same ship empty but with stores and fuel. Deadweight 
tonnage is a useful measure of the absolute cargo capacity (within 5%). 
10 Nya Sjöfartens Bok 2005, Svensk Sjöfartstidnings Förlag AB, Breakwater Publishing, p. 33. 
11 United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, December 10, 1982, in force October 1, 
1994. 
 5
the area of marine environmental protection issues and understated its own competencies 
and responsibilities. After the Erika and the Prestige accidents, the EU has undertaken 
larger responsibilities instead of waiting for the IMO to agree to develop higher 
standards.12 The EU’s major concern is that the international regulations that are passed 
by the IMO are not applied efficiently and therefore the EU is looking for larger 
legislative power in the maritime field. 
 
Thirdly, what are the possible consequences of the phase out of single hulled tankers for 
the shipping industry? There are several consequences of the phase out and this thesis 
will analyze a few of them. 
 
1.3 Method 
The thesis consists of three main chapters that are of different character. In chapter 2 the 
focus lies on the UNCLOS and the way the UNCLOS gives flag, port, and coastal states 
jurisdiction when it comes to legislating about pollution from ships. This chapter presents 
the basis for how states may put double hull requirements on ships registered in the 
state’s registry or sailing in its waters. UNCLOS thereby gives the frames for how far 
unilateral legislation, like the EU regulation, may go beyond international legislation 
passed by the IMO. Consequently the purpose of this chapter is to analyze whether the 
EU may develop maritime legislation that prevent single hull tankers from registering in 
EU member states, enter the ports of EU member states, and navigate in EU member 
states’ waters. 
 
Chapter 3 explains the development of the MARPOL and EU regulations that phase out 
single hull tankers. This development is studied with the four oil spills from the Torrey 
Canyon, the Exxon Valdez, the Erika, and the Prestige as a setting in order to show how 
legislation develops after the event of an accident. The IMO and the EU influenced each 
other during the development of the phasing out schedules. Therefore, the two 
organizations’ steps towards the phase out schemes of today are presented in 
chronological order. This emphasizes how the IMO and the EU affected and pressured 
each other to keep the legislative process up. One of the main points here is to show how 
the EU widened its legislative role regarding maritime legislation. The IMO has been the 
sole international body to develop maritime legislation but with the phase out of single 
hull tankers, the EU has made itself into an actor in this field. 
 
Finally, chapter 4 analyzes the possible consequences that the phase out of single hull 
tankers may have for the shipping industry as a whole. This chapter divides the shipping 
industry into four different markets: the newbuilding market that trades new ships, the 
freight market that trades sea transport services, the sale and purchase market that trades 
                                                 
12 Hedemann-Robinson, Martin. Protection of the Marine Environment and the European Union: some 
critical reflections on law, policy and practice. The Journal of International Maritime Law, June-July 2004, 
Vol. 10, Issue 3, p. 254. 
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second hand ships, and the demolition market that trades old ships. When studying 
possible consequences for the shipping industry I reflected over how legislation suddenly 
changes the rules for the actors on the market. Hence, adequate legislation is extremely 
important when it comes to an international, which is includes a number of different 
actors. 
 
1.4 Delimitation 
In order to make this thesis readable, I have had to narrow the topic down. A lot has been 
written on the phasing out of single hulled tankers and the objective is to stay close to the 
regulations developed by the IMO and the EU. Therefore, I briefly mention the OPA 90 
since this thesis focuses on the IMO and EU regulations. The MARPOL consists of a 
number of Annexes and only Annex I and, especially, the amendments dealing with the 
phasing out of single hulled tankers are of interest here.  
 
This thesis does not study the structure of the IMO or the EU. The reader is, 
consequently, supposed to have basic knowledge of the two organizations and how 
conventions and regulations are developed by each organization. 
 
The huge amount of legislation that followed upon the Erika accident were named the 
Erika I and Erika II packages. The phasing out of single hulled tankers is just one of a 
series of measures in dealing with the prevention of oil pollution. Other measures include 
the Condition Assessment Scheme (CAS) that affects how single hulled tankers are 
phased out. As the CAS involves another set of rules, for example on how the 
assessments of single hulled tankers are supposed to be made, it would in itself be a 
whole thesis and, therefore, there is no room for a description of this set of rules. The 
focus of this thesis is solely on the set of rules concerning the phase out of single hulled 
tankers. 
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2  The UNCLOS and flag, port and 
coastal states 
2.1 The UNCLOS 
The United Nations’ Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) states in detail the 
extent to which states have rights or duties when it comes to legislation about pollution 
from ships. Different rules apply to flag states, coastal states, and port states. The 
obligation of the flag state is the same whether the ship is in the internal waters, the 
territorial sea, the contiguous zone, in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), or on the high 
seas. The rights of the port state depend on whether a particular ship is leaving or entering 
a port in the port state, and for the coastal state in which area the ship is sailing.13
 
International law, which relates to the protection and preservation of the marine 
environment, develops as a response to concrete casualties. The UNCLOS has, from a 
legal point of view, been a milestone in the development of international law on the 
subject. Unlike other fields of international law, treaty law largely and mainly governs 
marine pollution14 and the UNCLOS’ provisions on flag state and coastal state 
jurisdiction are generally recognized to represent customary law.15
 
The international maritime community is probably among the most sensitive towards 
regional or other unilateral initiatives. The argument, strongly upheld by both the 
maritime industry and a considerable number of governments, is that a global business, 
where the players easily can choose the jurisdiction of their operations, needs regulation 
at a global level in order to avoid a patchwork of standards in various geographical areas. 
The EU is party to the UNCLOS, which means that the UNCLOS is binding upon the EU 
member states and the institutions of the EU.16 The UNCLOS demands that its 
contracting parties ensure that any other international agreements on protecting and 
preserving the marine environment are to be carried out in a “manner consistent with [the 
UNCLOS’] general principles and objectives”.17 This severely limits the ability of the EU 
to adopt enhanced unilateral safety measures for ships entering European marine 
waters.18  
                                                 
13 Ringbom, Henrik. Preventing Pollution from Ships – Reflections on the ‘Adequacy’ of Existing Rules. 
Review of European Community and International Law, Volume 8, Issue 1, 1999, p. 21.  
14 Vessel--source Pollution and Coastal State Jurisdiction – The Work of the ILA Committee on Coastal 
State Jurisdiction Relating to Marine Pollution (1991-2000), edited by Erik Franckx, Kluwer Law 
International 2001, p. 11-31. 
15 Ringbom, Preventing Pollution from Ships – Reflections on the ’Adequacy’ of Existing Rules. p. 22. 
16 Hedemann-Robinson, p. 269. 
17 Article 237 of the UNCLOS. 
18 Hedemann-Robinson, p. 272. 
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2.2 Flag state jurisdiction 
The flag state is the state in which a particular ship is registered. The flag state is 
obligated to adopt and enforce anti-pollution laws and regulations in compliance with 
international rules and standards adopted by IMO according to articles 211(2) and 217 of 
the UNCLOS. In accordance with article 211(2), states must adopt laws and regulations 
for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution of the marine environment from 
ships "flying their flag or of their registry". Only flag states can adopt standards for ships 
but these standards must at least have the same effect as that of “generally accepted 
international rules and standards,” for example those contained in the MARPOL 73/78, 
established though the competent international organization19, in this case the IMO.20 
Article 217 exclusively addresses the enforcement of international rules and standards by 
flag states and provides that such enforcement must take place "irrespective of where a 
violation occurs.” The flag state is further more free to uphold a higher standard on 
environmental rules for the ships registered in its registry than what is required 
internationally.21
 
Rules according to design and equipment, such as the phasing out of single-hull tankers, 
have to be enforced by the flag state since it is under their jurisdiction to enforce the 
legislation on ships registered in their registry. 
 
2.3 Port state jurisdiction 
The port state must generally be understood as referring to the state (or states) to whose 
port a ship is proceeding at a given moment. Port state jurisdiction according to article 
218 of the UNCLOS relates to the enforcement of the applicable international rules and 
standards in respect of a discharge from a ship outside the port state’s internal waters, 
territorial sea or EEZ. Port state enforcement jurisdiction depends on the foreign ship 
being voluntarily within a port or at an offshore terminal of the port state. 
 
Foreign ships do not enjoy unrestricted rights of entry into ports unless there is a specific 
treaty regime applicable according to general international law. Unless there are rights of 
passage safeguarded, sovereignty is normally exclusive. These rights apply through 
internal waters that were formerly high seas, archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and 
straits used for international navigation. 
 
Even where there is a right of passage an automatic right to enter a port does not exist 
according to the UNCLOS. Article 211 (3) of the UNCLOS imply that port states may 
put requirements on ships entering their ports. A port state is entitled to deny access 
                                                 
19 Article 211 (2) of the UNCLOS. 
20 Ringbom. Environmental Protection and Shipping – Prescriptive Coastal State Jurisdiction in the 
1990’s. MARIUS Nr. 224, Nordisk Institutt for Sjørett. Oslo, December 1996, p. 16. 
21 Ibid., p. 14. 
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according to Article 211 (3) to a ship entering its port whenever the port entry 
requirements of such state concerning construction, equipment, and manning of the ship 
are not complied with. The same article further on expressly gives a right for “co-
operative arrangements” concerning port entry requirements between two or more states 
in a region.22 From this follows that an EU regulation restricting single hulled tankers 
from EU member states’ ports is in accordance with the rights given to the port states by 
the UNCLOS. 
 
Article 211 (3) also gives port states the possibility to set up special measures “which 
establish particular requirements for the prevention, reduction and control of pollution of 
the marine environment as a condition for the entry of foreign ships into their ports.” If 
international conventions set up regulations on hull construction and port states set up 
stricter requirements, there may be a conflict between international commitments and the 
port states’ sovereignty.23 There seems to be a recognition of port states’ rights to regulate 
beyond international conventions, which means seeing the conventions as minimum 
requirements, as long as there are no duties restraining such action in the convention.24 
Port states have more possibilities to challenge international conventions than coastal 
states have as we shall see below. 
 
2.4 Coastal state jurisdiction 
The basic distinction between the enforcement jurisdiction of port states and that of 
coastal states is that the enforcement jurisdiction of a coastal state relates to violations of 
the laws and regulations of the coastal state in its internal waters, territorial sea, EEZ, or 
on the contiguous zone and is applied for the protection of the coastal state itself. The 
formal distinction according to the UNCLOS between port state jurisdiction and coastal 
state jurisdiction is in the direct consequence of the extension of the costal state’s 
jurisdiction over its EEZ.  
 
When it was realized in the 1970’s that flag state jurisdiction was not sufficient to protect 
coastal states from pollution, coastal states needed jurisdiction to set up their own 
pollution legislation. In order to find a reasonable balance between the coastal state’s 
jurisdiction and foreign ships rights to innocent passage, the UNCLOS’ Article 211 sets 
the guidelines for their jurisdiction. The wider legislative powers of port states have been 
a reason for coastal states to try to put restrictions on ships by exercising port state 
jurisdiction. This is not possible since only port states have the jurisdiction to put 
requirements on ships entering their ports.25
 
                                                 
22 Ringbom. MARIUS, p. 128. 
23 Ibid., p. 23. 
24 Ibid., p. 23. 
25 Ringbom. Preventing Pollution from Ships – Reflections on the ‘Adequacy’ of Existing Rules, p. 23. 
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The coastal state has competence to legislate for the protection and preservation of the 
marine environment providing it does so without prejudice to the freedom of navigation. 
The coastal state’s pollution laws must confirm and give effect to generally accepted 
international rules and standards in order to be accepted laws according to the 
UNCLOS.26 As a result, coastal states must adhere to international conventions and are 
not free to pass legislation that goes beyond international conventions such as the 
UNCLOS. 
 
2.4.1 The internal waters 
Internal waters are defined as all waters on the landward side of the baseline from which 
the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.27 A coastal state has full sovereignty within 
its internal waters since they are classified as an integral part of the coastal state. No right 
of passage, innocent or else, exists for foreign ships in internal waters in the absence of a 
treaty or other agreement. A limitation on a coastal state’s sovereignty may although arise 
under international customary law or under treaties that the coastal state has entered 
into.28  
 
There is no obligation for a coastal state to allow foreign ships into its internal waters, 
except in cases of distress and where drawing straight baselines encloses waters, which 
were not previously regarded as internal waters where the right of innocent passage still 
applies.29 Besides these exceptions, coastal states are free to restrict or impose conditions 
upon entry into internal waters, including ports. After all, several international 
conventions require states to prevent unseaworthy ships from entering ports as a matter of 
international law.30 When a foreign ship has entered internal waters, it is subject to the 
domestic legislation, which can be enforced against it.  
 
States that want to establish particular requirements for the prevention, reduction, and 
control of marine pollution as a condition for the entry into their ports or internal waters 
must give “due publicity” to such requirements and to communicate these to the IMO 
according to the UNCLOS Article 211 (3).31
 
                                                 
26 Özcayir, Oya. Port state control, London, Lloyd’s of London Press, 2003, p. 72. 
27 Article 8 of the UNCLOS. 
28 Özcayir. Port state control, p. 68. 
29 Article 8 (2) of the UNCLOS. 
30 Evans, Michael D. International Law, Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 630 ff. 
31 Rue, Collin de la, Anderson, Charles B. Shipping and the Environment, LLP Reference Publishing, 
London, 1998, p. 902. 
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2.4.2 The territorial sea 
The territorial sea, which can range up to twelve nautical miles from the coast, is 
considered to be territory of the coastal state.32 The coastal state enjoys sovereignty but 
has to respect the rights of foreign ships in the territorial sea.33 The jurisdiction enjoyed 
by a state within its territorial sea could be compared to that which it may exercise within 
its internal waters and the contiguous zone. These together represent a progression from 
the strongest to the weakest form of jurisdictional competence that the coastal state 
enjoys over maritime spaces based upon territorial sovereignty.34 Although the coastal 
state exercises ‘sovereignty’ within its territorial sea, this sovereignty is circumscribed in 
a number of ways. 
 
The basic restriction of the coastal state’s sovereignty is the right of innocent passage for 
ships from other states through the coastal state’s territorial sea. This is how the territorial 
sea is distinguished from the internal waters, where the coastal state has complete 
jurisdiction. The UNCLOS regulates the right of innocent passage of foreign ships 
through the territorial sea in Article 17. There is no right to enter a foreign port, but there 
is a well-established right of foreign ships to exercise innocent passage through territorial 
seas over which the coastal state has a right of regulation.35  
 
Innocent passage is given a broad meaning in the UNCLOS and is presumed to exist 
unless one or more of a number of specified situations occur. In relation to pollution 
issues, passage is deemed innocent unless there is an act of “wilful and serious pollution” 
contrary to the UNCLOS. In this case, the coastal state has unrestricted enforcement 
jurisdiction.36 The emphasis is clearly on intentional and not accidental pollution. The 
coastal state’s laws and regulations must be consistent with the UNCLOS and other rules 
of international law, such as the IMO conventions. The laws and regulations of the 
coastal state must also be given due publicity, practically meaning that the IMO must be 
informed.37
 
Article 21 (2) regulates how a coastal state may adopt laws and regulations, giving it 
legislative jurisdiction within the territorial sea. Foreign ships must comply with the 
coastal state’s laws and regulations but these laws and regulations can not apply to the 
design, equipment, manning, or construction of foreign ships unless they give effect to 
generally accepted international rules and standards.38  
 
                                                 
32 Ringbom. MARIUS, p. 17. 
33 Özcayir. Port State Control, p. 70. 
34 Evans. International Law, p. 630 ff. 
35 Article 17 of the UNCLOS. 
36 Article 19 (2)(h) of the UNCLOS. 
37 Article 21 (2) of the UNCLOS. 
38 Article 21 (2) of the UNCLOS. 
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Beside the restrictions, according to Articles 17 and 21 (2) the coastal state has full 
sovereignty in its territorial sea.39  
 
The UNCLOS provisions limit the possibilities for the EU to intervene to control the 
movements of ships that pollute or are liable to pollute in European waters. Even though 
the UNCLOS gives states the possibilities and duties to undertake measures to preserve 
and protect the marine environment, any unilateral or collective measures by such states 
are subject to the overriding principle of so-called ‘innocent passage’ of international 
maritime traffic passing through coastal waters. The EU regulation does not in full ban 
single hulled tankers from entering the coastal waters of the EU since there are some 
legal implications imposed by the UNCLOS in respect of “innocent passage” for 
international ships.40
 
Therefore, the rights of coastal states to intervene from a precautionary perspective to 
control the movements of hazardous threats from ships registered in other flag states are 
compromised as coastal states may not “hamper innocent passage of foreign ships”41 nor 
specify design, construction, manning or equipment standards other than generally 
accepted international rules and standards. 
 
2.4.3 The contiguous zone 
Under Article 33 of the UNCLOS, the contiguous zone is referred to as “a zone 
contiguous to its territorial sea.” A coastal state’s rights in the contiguous zone are a 
functional and protective measure. According to Article 33 (1) of the UNCLOS the 
coastal state may exercise the control necessary to prevent infringement of its customs, 
fiscal, immigration, or sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or territorial sea. 
The coastal state exercises control and not jurisdiction within the contiguous zone. The 
rights of the coastal state in the zone do not amount to sovereignty.42
 
2.4.4 The exclusive economic zone 
With the UNCLOS a new ocean zone was defined, the EEZ. Until then the EEZ had been 
a concept of customary law, but with the UNCLOS, it is recognized and affirms the 
coastal state’s powers over the natural resources within its EEZ. The coastal state has 
sovereign rights for specific purposes but does not have the sovereignty comparable with 
what the coastal state enjoys in the territorial sea. Under Article 33 of the UNCLOS, the 
                                                 
39 Özcayir. Port state control, p. 70. 
40Hedemann-Robinson. Protection of the Marine Environment and the European Union: some critical 
reflections on law, policy and practice, p. 270. 
41 Article 211(4) of the UNCLOS. 
42 Özcayir. Port state control, p. 72. 
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EEZ is defined as “an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea” and it is open for 
states to claim one, although it is not obligatory.43  
 
The UNCLOS has restricted the range of coastal states’ legislative power in the territorial 
sea, but has increased it by giving them certain powers to legislate about marine pollution 
from foreign ships in the EEZ.44 Article 211 (5) gives the coastal state the power to adopt 
pollution legislation that conforms and gives effect to “generally accepted international 
rules and standards established through the competent international organization or 
general diplomatic conference.” When such rules do not provide sufficient protection for 
certain areas of the EEZ, the coastal state may implement international rules and 
standards, or adopt additional regulations of its own as long as these do not impose 
design, construction, manning, or equipment standards on foreign ships other than 
generally accepted international rules and standards. Before doing so, consultation with 
the IMO and obtaining IMO’s approval is necessary as well as giving at least fifteen 
months notice of the entry into force of the coastal state’s regulations.45  
 
Finally, article 234 provides for ice-covered areas, lying “within the limits” of the EEZ, 
which would seem to include the territorial sea as well as the EEZ, the coastal state may 
adopt non-discriminatory pollution regulations. In this case there is no requirement that 
design, construction, manning or equipment standards must conform to generally 
accepted international rules although the coastal state’s regulations must have “due regard 
to navigation” nor are there any particular procedures to be observed.46 The coastal state 
has no limitations or qualifications to enforce this competence. 
 
The coastal state may exercise its enforcement powers in its territorial sea or EEZ in 
respect of violations not only of its own pollution rules, but also of “applicable 
international rules and standards.” The effect may be that some coastal states take action 
to enforce the provisions of conventions to which they, and possibly the flag state of the 
offending ship, are not parties. This is if unless “applicable” refers to rules, which are 
contained in a convention, to which the coastal state is a party, or are part of customary 
international law. 
 
So far, however, the UNCLOS appears to have had a limited impact on state practice, 
especially regarding the jurisdiction of coastal and port states. As regards coastal states’ 
jurisdiction in the EEZ, most states claiming an EEZ do no more than repeat the basic 
provision in article 56 (1)(b) of the Convention, namely that they have jurisdiction with 
regard to the protection and preservation of the marine environment.  
 
                                                 
43 Özcayir. Port state control, p. 71. 
44 Churchill, R. R, Lowe, A. V. The Law of the Sea, 3rd edition, 1999, Manchester University Press, p.    
347. 
45 Article 211 (6) of the UNCLOS. 
46 Churchill, Lowe. The Law of the Sea, p. 348. 
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2.4.5 The high seas 
The high seas are according to UNCLOS Article 86 all parts of the sea that are not 
included in any other maritime zone. Ships have for a long time enjoyed freedom of 
navigation on the high seas providing that navigation is exercised with “due regard” for 
the interest of other states.47 Only the flag state has the competence to enact laws and 
standards on pollution from ships on the high seas.
                                                 
47 Article 87 (2) of the UNCLOS. 
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3 The development of 
regulations to phase out single 
hulled oil tankers 
A presentation of the IMO is needed before studying the development of the single 
hull phase out according to the MARPOL 73/78 and the EU regulation. To further 
understand how double hulled tankers came about, a presentation of some of the first 
steps of maritime legislation to prevent pollution from oil is made.  
 
3.1 The IMO is established 
It was always known that, to improve safety at sea, the establishment of a competent 
international body was detrimental. The international regulations adopted by this body 
would be followed by all shipping nations. Before, treaties had been adopted but it 
was getting near to impossible to get several countries to agree on different treaties. 
When the United Nations (UN) was established the hopes for an international body 
was realized. 
 
The UN Maritime Conference established the after-sought international organization 
in Geneva in 1948. A convention48 then established the Inter-Governmental Maritime 
Consultative Organization (IMCO) in 1948 but the name was changed to the IMO in 
1982.49 The constitutive treaty, signed in 1948, came into force in 1958. The IMO is 
the UN’s specialized agency for shipping and it is the organization that has had the 
most effect upon the law of the sea. 
 
The IMO has a wide competence in matters affecting shipping. The committees, such 
as the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC), the Legal Committee (LC) and the Marine 
Environment Protection Committee (MEPC), have played important roles in the 
establishment of regulations concerning navigation and pollution.50 Some of the 
regulations are presented to the Council, where the 32 member states with the largest 
interests in shipping are represented. The Council passes the regulations on to the 
Assembly, which meets every other year and where all member states, at present 
about 16451, have a seat.52 The regulations may be recommended proposals, by the 
Assembly, and then to be followed by member states. These recommendations are not 
binding but the IMO may later have them adopted as conventions. Around forty 
conventions and protocols have been concluded this way and many of them have been 
ratified by several member states. The IMO does not have any enforcement tools for 
                                                 
48 Convention on the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization, Geneva, March 6, 1948. 
The name of the convention was changed in 1982 to ‘Convention on the International Maritime 
Organization’.  
49 From here on the IMCO will be called the IMO even before the change of the name in 1982. 
50 Churchill, Lowe. The law of the sea, p. 23. 
51 Nya Sjöfartens Bok, 2005, p. 97. 
52 Churchill, Lowe. The law of the sea, p. 23. 
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its conventions or agreements, but does instead rely on the member states to 
implement these as they sign up to them. The IMO agreements are usually general in 
their wording and the detailed implementation of them is left to the individual 
member states. It has become clear that the ordinary framework for international 
action on maritime safety under the support of the IMO is inadequate of what is 
needed to tackle the causes of such marine pollutions effectively. The IMO suffers 
from a major handicap since it lacks the proper means to verify how its regulations are 
applied throughout the world.53
 
3.2 The OILPOL 
In 1954, the United Kingdom (UK) organized a conference on oil pollution. Thirty-
two countries, representing 95% of the world’s merchant tonnage, participated in the 
conference. The conference resulted in the adoption of the International Convention 
for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil54 (OILPOL) in 1954.55 The OILPOL 
mainly regulated pollution resulting from routine tanker operations and from the 
discharge of oily wastes from machinery spaces. The problem with accidental 
pollution was not addressed. These were regarded as the major causes of oil pollution 
from ships. The OILPOL entered into force on July 26, 1958, and what the OILPOL 
did to prevent pollution from oil was to: 
 
- establish “prohibited zones” extending at least 50 miles from the nearest land in 
which the discharge of oil or of mixtures containing more than 100 parts per oil per 
million was forbidden and 
- require contracting parties to take all appropriate steps to promote the provision of 
facilities for the reception of oily water and residues.56
 
In 1962, amendments were made to the OILPOL that extended its application to ships 
of a lower tonnage and also extended the “prohibited zones”. The 1969 amendments 
further restricted operational discharge of oil from oil tankers and from machinery 
spaces of all ships. The OILPOL did have some impact on the prevention of oil 
pollution but the growth in oil trade and developments in industrial practices required 
further action. But pollution control was in 1962 still a minor concern for the IMO 
and the possible consequences of a large oil spill would be seen later. The grounding 
of the Torrey Canyon in 1967, when 120,000 tonnes of oil was spilled, proved the 
scale of the problem. 
 
3.3 Post-Torrey Canyon actions 
The Liberian tanker the Torrey Canyon was in 1967 one of the largest ships in the 
world. She carried more than 120,000 tonnes of crude oil, from Kuwait, when she ran 
                                                 
53 COM(2000) 142 final on the safety of the seaborne oil trade, p. 4. 
54 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, London, May 12, 1954. In 
force July 26, 1958. 
55 Rue, Anderson. Shipping and the Environment, p. 759. 
56 www.imo.org, Prevention of Marine Pollution Conventions, MARPOL 73/78. 
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aground outside the Scilly Isles, UK, on March 18, 1967. She broke apart and the 
escaping oil polluted the south west of England, the Channel Islands, and Brittany. 
Thousands of sea birds died and the tourist season was spoiled for the local people. 
The Torrey Canyon grounding resulted in the largest oil pollution accident ever 
recorded up to that date. Out of the Torrey Canyon disaster a new convention was 
signed in 1969, the International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High 
Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties.57 It came into force in 1975 and gives 
coastal states the right to take such measures on the high seas as may be necessary “to 
prevent, mitigate or eliminate danger to its coastline or related interests from pollution 
by oil or the threat thereof, following upon a maritime casualty.” Such actions must be 
necessary and only be undertaken after consultations with, in particular, the flag state, 
the owners of the ship, the owners of the cargo, and sometimes independent experts 
that are appointed for this purpose. A coastal state that takes actions that are not 
permitted is liable to pay compensation for any damage caused by such measures.58
 
3.3.1 The MARPOL 
In the following years, the IMO implemented a number of measures to prevent tanker 
accidents and to minimize the consequences of accidents. The IMO held an 
extraordinary session of its council to draw up an action plan on technical and legal 
aspects of the Torrey Canyon accident. In 1969, the IMO Assembly decided to hold 
an international conference four years later, in 1973, in order to prepare an 
international agreement against the pollution of the sea, land, and air by ships.59
 
The following international conference in 1973 incorporated the OILPOL and its 
amendments into The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from 
Ships,60 which was going to be the most important international instrument in the 
prevention of pollution from oil in particular. The 1973 Convention addressed only 
the issue of operational pollution and required ballast to be carried only in clean or 
segregated ballast tanks. This would avoid the pollution that may occur when ballast 
water containing remnants of oil is discharged from cargo tanks or when tanks are 
being cleaned.  
 
In February of 1978, as a response to a number of accidents, the IMO held a 
Conference on Tanker Safety and Pollution Prevention. The necessary number or 
parties ratifying the 1973 Convention were still lacking and this hindered it from 
entering into force. The considerable economic costs and technical difficulties that it 
took to comply with the 1973 Convention’s provisions stopped countries from 
ratifying it. A Protocol was, therefore, added in 1978 at the Conference on Tanker 
Safety and Pollution Prevention and it absorbed the 1973 convention and it is now 
known as the International Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from 
Ships, 1973 as modified by the protocol of 1978 relating thereto (MARPOL 73/78). 
                                                 
57 International Convention relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution 
Casualties, Brussels, November 29, 1969. In force May 6, 1975. 
58 www.imo.org, Prevention of Marine Pollution Conventions, The International Convention Relating 
to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, 1969. 
59 www.imo.org, Prevention of Marine Pollution Conventions, MARPOL 73/78. 
60 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, London, November 2, 1973. 
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The MARPOL is designed to deal with all forms of intentional pollution of the sea 
from ships, other than dumping. It is made up of six annexes that concern oil (Annex 
I), noxious liquid substances in bulk (Annex II), harmful substances carried by sea in 
packaged forms (Annex III), sewage (Annex IV), garbage (Annex V), and air 
pollution (Annex VI). 
 
To achieve the entry into force of MARPOL 73/78, the 1978 Protocol allowed states 
to become party to the MARPOL 73/78 by first implementing Annex I covering oil as 
it was decided that Annex II on chemicals would not become binding until three years 
after the Protocol entered into force. Annex II would not be binding until three years 
after the entry into force of the Protocol or of such longer period as might be decided 
by the parties to the MARPOL. This gave states time to overcome technical problems 
in Annex I, which for some had been a major obstacle in their achievement to ratify 
the 1973 Convention. This modification resulted in that the MARPOL 73/78 and 
Annex I came into force in October 1983 and Annex II in April 1987. Annex III came 
into force in July 1992, Annex IV in September 2003, and Annex V in December 
1988. Annex VI comes into force in May 2005.  
 
The 1978 Protocol also added some changes to Annex I, for example protectively 
located segregated ballast tanks61 were required on all new tankers of 20,000 dwt and 
above. The segregated ballast tanks had to be positioned as to help protect the cargo 
tanks in the event of a collision or grounding. This was the first attempt to directly 
address the issue of accidental pollution. The 1978 amendments to MARPOL 73/78 
was a Russian roulette concerning accidental pollution since less than 50% of the 
cargo tanks were unprotected by the protectively located segregated ballast tanks. The 
increasing tanker traffic, in the end of the 1970s, together with the increase in both 
tanker size and the cargo being carried meant that the risks of spills were substantial.  
 
All of the Annexes have been amended since 1978 by using the tacit amendment 
procedure. This is when an amendment enters into force on a specified date unless an 
agreed number of states object by an agreed date. The basic principle is that states are 
assumed to consent to the new regulation if they do not specifically object within a 
certain period.62 States do not have to present the new regulation to their legislature 
for approval, which is some cases may take many years. The new regulation comes 
into force for all states that do not object by a specified date, usually after 18 months, 
provided that one-third of the parties do not object. 
 
It appears as if the MARPOL 73/78 has resulted in the reduction of accidental 
pollution from ships. The quantity of oil spilt during the 1970s was about 3,142,000 
tonnes, during the 1980s it was about 1,176,000 tonnes, and during the 1990s the total 
quantity of oil spilt was 1,140,000 tonnes.63 The MARPOL 73/78 has most certainly 
attributed to this decline in accidental oil spill along with better methods of 
controlling the disposal of wastes.64
 
                                                 
61 This meant that the segregated ballast tanks had to be arranged so that the side and bottom area of the 
tanks were 30-45 % of the total side and bottom area of the entire hull. 
62 www.imo.org, About IMO, Frequently Asked Questions.  
63 www.itopf.com, Historical Data, Statistics.  
64 www.imo.org, About IMO, Frequently Asked Questions. 
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The OILPOL is now mostly of historical interest since the MARPOL 73/78 replaces 
the OILPOL. Fewer then twenty parties to the OILPOL have not become parties to the 
MARPOL 73/78. They are therefore bound by the OILPOL but it is of less 
importance since their collective fleet amount for a small portion of the total world 
fleet.65 Annex I and II have 130 contracting parties that represent 97.07% of the 
world’s tonnage 66 and the remaining states are bound by UNCLOS’ reference to 
“generally accepted rules and standards”.67 The large amount of contracting parties to 
Annex I and II must make them fall into the category of “generally accepted 
international rules and standards” referred to in several of the UNCLOS articles 
mentioned above because of their international acceptance and wide applicability.68
 
3.4 Post-Exxon Valdez actions 
In 1989 the single hulled Exxon Valdez went aground in the Prince William Sound 
outside the coast of Alaska. The resulting oil spill released about 37,000 tonnes of 
heavy crude oil into the sound and its neighbouring waterways.69 The sheer magnitude 
of this disaster provoked the issuance of the United States Oil Pollution Act of 1990 
(OPA 90), which ordered the immediate phase out in U.S. waters of single-hulled 
tankers such as the Exxon Valdez.70 OPA 90 required new oil tankers to be double 
hulled and established a phase out scheme for existing single hulled tankers. Older 
single hulled tankers were phased out starting in 1995 and the final date for phase out 
of all single hulled tankers is in 2015. The phase out of any particular single hull 
tanker was based upon its year of build, its gross tonnage, and whether it had been 
fitted with either double side or double bottom. 
 
The Exxon Valdez oil spill caused widespread environmental damage in Alaska and a 
heavy financial burden on Exxon, one of the world’s largest corporations. But the 
incident is not even among the top twenty oil spills. The wreck of Torrey Canyon 
spilled three times as much oil. But the Exxon Valdez spill was the largest oil spill in 
US history emanating from a ship. It affected the marine transport of oil and changed 
the way US society, government, media, and the industry would deal with oil 
pollution in the future. The incident induced a burst of legislative activity in the US 
Congress and as a result, the OPA 90 went into force. 
 
                                                 
65 Churchill, Lowe. The Law of the Sea, p. 338-352. 
66 www.imo.org as of January 31, 2005. 
67 Article 211 (2) of the UNCLOS. 
68 Keselj, Tatjana. Port State Jurisdiction in Respect of Pollution from Ships: The 1982 United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Memoranda of Understanding, Ocean Development & 
International Law, No. 30, 1999, p. 127-160. 
69 ITOPF Handbook 2004/2005. 
70 Birkland, Thomas A. In the Wake of the Exxon Valdez, Environment, September 1998, Volume 40, 
Number 7. 
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3.4.1 The IMO reacts by adopting regulations 13F 
and 13G 
The IMO did not react to the single hull phase out in the US until in 1992. That is 
when international requirements for the double hulling of oil tankers were introduced 
by the IMO on March 6. Amendments to Annex I of MARPOL 73/78 were adopted. 
The amendments introduced two new regulations, 13F and 13G, relating to standards 
for design and construction of new and existing oil tankers.71
 
3.4.1.1 Regulation 13F 
Regulation 13F required all new tankers contracted on or after July 6 in 1993 of 600 
dwt or more to follow specified hull requirements. Oil tankers between 600 dwt and 
5,000 dwt must be fitted with double bottom or double sides with a separated space 
that has to be at least 0.76 meters. Oil tankers of 5,000 dwt and above are required to 
have a double hull, which means double bottom and double sides, separated by a 
space of up to two meters. 13F also specifies that other designs may be accepted as 
alternative to double hull as long as they give at least the same level of protection 
against oil pollution in the event of a collision or grounding. 
 
Amongst the alternatives is to incorporate a so-called “mid-deck” under which the 
pressure within the cargo tank does not exceed the external hydrostatic water pressure. 
Tankers with this design have double sides but not a double bottom. Instead of a 
double bottom, another deck, the “mid-deck”, is installed inside the cargo tank with 
the venting arranged so that there is an upward pressure on the bottom of the hull. The 
hydrostatic water pressure prevents the outflow of oil by loading the cargo so that the 
hydrostatic pressure at the tank bottom is less than the external water pressure. If the 
tank is breached by grounding, sea water flows in instead of oil flowing out. 
 
Other designs and constructions may be accepted as long as such designs and 
constructions ensure at least the same level of protection against oil pollution in the 
event of a collision or stranding. They must also be approved by the MEPC based on 
guidelines developed by the IMO.72 Further on, new requirements were introduced for 
oil tankers of 20,000 dwt and above concerning subdivision and stability.  
 
Tankers of 5,000 dwt and above shall comply with regulation 13F not later than April 
5, 2005. Tankers between 600 dwt and 5,000 dwt shall be fitted with a double hull, 
which means a double bottom and double sides, complying with the dimension 
requirements in regulation 13F (7) not later than the date of the delivery of the ship in 
2008. Various types of exemptions to extend the time when a single hull tanker can 
carry heavy grade oil may be granted by the state in which a ship is registered, the so-
called flag state. The exemptions have been drafted to accommodate various domestic 
and regional needs during a transitional period. A flag state may allow a single hulled 
tanker between 600 dwt and 5,000 dwt to carry heavy grade oil until it reaches 25 
years. A flag state may also allow a tanker with double bottom or double sides of 
5,000 dwt and above to carry heavy grade oil until it reaches 25 years.  
                                                 
71 Marine Environmental Protection Committee 52 (32). 
72 www.imo.org, Marine Environment, MARPOL, The 1992 Amendments.  
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A party to the MARPOL 73/78 was entitled to deny entry, except when this is 
necessary for the purpose of securing the safety of a ship or saving life at sea, of 
single hulled tankers carrying heavy grade oil, which have been allowed to continue 
operation under the exemptions mentioned above, into the ports or offshore terminals 
under its jurisdiction. 
 
3.4.1.2 Regulation 13G 
Regulation 13G applies to existing crude oil tankers of 20,000 dwt and above and 
product tankers of 30,000 dwt and above. The MARPOL Protocol of 1978 required 
segregated ballast tanks on all new tankers of 20,000 dwt and above and it was 
applicable in 1982. Oil tankers that are 25 years old and which were not constructed 
according to the requirements of the MARPOL Protocol have to be fitted with double 
sides and double bottoms according to 13G. These oil tankers are no longer permitted 
under Regulation 13G to operate after 2007 or 2012 unless they do not comply with 
the double hull requirements or equivalent design standards or Regulation 13F. 
Tankers built according to the standards of the MARPOL Protocol are exempt until 
they reach the age of 30. Therefore, tankers may not be operated after 2007, 25 years 
after 1982, or in certain cases 2012, if they do not comply with Regulation 13F. For 
existing single hull oil tankers delivered after June 1 in 1982 or those delivered before 
June 1 in 1982 and which are converted, complying with the requirements of 
MARPOL 73/78 on segregated ballast tanks and their protective location, this 
deadline would be reached at the latest in 2026.  
 
3.4.2 EU Regulation 2978/94 
The first EU regulation to deal with double hulled oil tankers and segregated ballast 
tanks was adopted November 21, 1994 and went into force on January 1, 1996. 
Regulation 2978/9473 had as its objective to promote the use of environmentally 
friendly oil tankers to, from and within EU ports. This was made by giving tankers 
operated as segregated ballast oil tankers, double hulled tankers, and oil tankers of an 
alternative design lowered fees by port, harbour, and pilotage authorities. The fees for 
these kind of tankers were to be reduced by the tonnage of the segregated ballast tanks 
to ensure that this type of tanker did not attract higher port fees due to its greater 
tonnage for the same load capacity.  
An EU regulation has to be applied fully by the EU member states, which means that 
a member state has no power to apply a Regulation incompletely or to select only 
some provisions. The member states and their governing institutions and courts are 
bound directly by EU law and have to comply in the same way as with national law.74 
This means that Regulation 2978/94 had to be complied to by all the EU member 
states as it went into force in 1996. No member state could levy higher charges on a 
tanker with segregated ballast tanks after that date.  
 
                                                 
73 Council Regulation (EC) No 2978/94 of 21 November 1994 on the implementation of IMO 
Resolution A.747(18) on the application of tonnage measurement of ballast spaces in segregated ballast 
oil tankers. 
74 Craig, Paul. de Burca, Grainne. EU Law, Third edition, Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 112-114. 
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There were no other measures taken by the EU until the accident outside the French 
coast with the oil tanker the Erika in 1999.  
 
3.4.3 The 1999 amendments to 13G 
Amendments to regulation 13G, rules for existing crude and product tankers, of 
Annex I were adopted on July 1, 1999, and entered into force on January 1, 2001. 
These amendments made existing oil tankers between 20,000 and 30,000 dwt carrying 
persistent product oil, including heavy diesel oil and fuel oil, subject to the same 
construction requirements as crude oil tankers. In principle, 13G requires that existing 
tankers must comply with the requirements for new tankers in regulation 13F, 
including double hull requirements for new tankers or alternative arrangements, no 
later than 25 years after the date of delivery. The amendments extended the 
application from applying to crude oil tankers of 20,000 dwt and above and product 
carriers of 30,000 dwt and above, to apply also to tankers between 20,000 and 30,000 
dwt that carry heavy diesel oil or fuel oil. The purpose was to address the concerns 
that oil pollution incidents involving persistent oils were as severe as those involving 
crude oil, so regulations applicable to crude oil tankers also apply to tankers carrying 
persistent oils.75
 
3.5 Post-Erika reactions 
On December 11, 1999, the Maltese-registered tanker the Erika, a 24-year old tanker 
with segregated ballast tanks, was carrying 31,000 tonnes of heavy fuel oil on her way 
to Italy when she encountered adverse weather conditions off the coast of France. The 
Erika split in two and spilt about 10,000 tonnes76 into the sea. A vast 400 km stretch 
of the French Atlantic coast was affected and the viscous oil slicks killed 
approximately 63,000 sea birds and numerous other marine organisms and animals. 
The physical damage was serious and extensive, cost of clean up very high, and the 
economic loss, including from tourism, was considerable. 77
 
The impact of the Erika proved to be almost as great as that of the Torrey Canyon in 
1967 and the Exxon Valdez in 1989. The Erika catastrophe outraged the public and 
forced the French government and the EU to threaten unilateral and regional action to 
prevent further casualties. It further on forced the IMO to react in order to protect its 
position as the only global forum where international legislation is made to protect the 
environment from international shipping activities.78  
 
                                                 
75 www.imo.org, Marine Environment, MARPOL, The 1999 Amendments.  
76 COM(2000) 142 final on the safety of the seaborne oil trade p. 4. 
77 Fayette, Louise de la. Protection of the Marine Environment in 2000, Environmental Policy & Law, 
2001, Vol. 31, Issue 3, p. 140-150. 
78 Fayette. The marine environment protection committee: The conjunction of the law of the sea and 
international environmental law, The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, Vol. 16, No 2, 
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3.5.1 A proposal for an EU regulation to accelerate 
the phase out of single hulled tankers 
In 2000, following the sinking of the Erika, the European Union Commission 
proposed to introduce a phase out scheme for single hull tankers similar to the OPA 
90. On November 30, 2000, the European Parliament approved, subject to a number 
of amendments, the Commission’s proposals for a regulation on the accelerated 
phasing-in of double hull or equivalent design requirements for single hull tankers. 
The amendments adopted by the European Parliament were based on the draft 
agreement drawn up at the MEPC 45th meeting. The amended proposal aimed at 
establishing an accelerated phasing-in scheme for the application of the double hull or 
equivalent design requirements of the MARPOL 73/78 to single hull tankers. The 
proposed phase-out schedule for single hull tankers was in line with the draft text of 
revised regulation 13 G of MARPOL 73/78 Annex I. Under the amended proposal the 
system of financial incentives and disincentives found in Regulation 2978/94 were 
withdrawn. Tankers below 5,000 dwt were excluded from the phase-out schedule of 
the proposal, to ensure normal supply to the market in the island regions of the EU. 
 
The EU’s concern was that due to differences between the OPA 90 and the MARPOL 
73/78, single hull tankers banned from U.S. waters because of their age would begin, 
from 2005 and onwards, to operate in other regions of the world, including the waters 
of the EU. Therefore, it was in the interest of the EU to adopt measures to avoid single 
hulled oil tankers from starting or continuing to operate in the EU. The EU member 
states decided to discuss the matter at the IMO first. The outcome was the 2001 
revised regulation 13G, with a phase out scheme stricter than before. 
 
3.5.2 The 2001 Amendments to 13G 
The Erika accident prompted the IMO to prepare significant amendments to 
MARPOL 73/78 to phase out older single hull tankers and to accelerate the phasing in 
of double hulls. The MEPC of IMO agreed during its 45th session in October 2-6, 
2000, to accelerate the MARPOL 73/78 Convention’s phase out of single-hull tankers 
by draft agreement to the MARPOL 73/78 Regulation 13G of Annex I. This 
agreement was to be refined and adopted at the MEPC 46th meeting in April of 
2001.79
 
The draft drawn up at 45th MEPC meeting identified three categories of tankers: 
 
- "Category 1 oil tanker" means oil tankers of 20,000 dwt and above carrying crude 
oil, fuel oil, heavy diesel oil or lubricating oil as cargo, and of 30,000 dwt and above 
carrying other oils, which do not comply with the requirements for protectively 
located segregated ballast tanks (commonly known as Pre-MARPOL tankers). 
 
                                                 
79 Özcayir. The Erika and Its Aftermath, International Maritime Law, September 2000, Volume 7 Issue 
7, p. 230 ff. 
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- "Category 2 oil tanker" means oil tankers of 20,000 dwt and above carrying crude 
oil, fuel oil, heavy diesel oil or lubricating oil as cargo, and of 30,000 dwt and above 
carrying other oils, which do comply with the protectively located segregated ballast 
tank requirements (MARPOL tankers), while 
 
- "Category 3 oil tanker" means an oil tanker of 5,000 dwt and above but less than the 
tonnage specified for Category 1 and 2 tankers.  
 
Although the new phase-out timetable, according to the draft agreement, sets 2015 as 
the principal cut-off date for all single-hull tankers, the flag state may allow for some 
newer single hull ships registered in its country that conform to certain technical 
specifications to continue trading until the 25th year of their delivery. However, any 
port state can deny entry of those single hull tankers that are allowed to operate until 
their 25th anniversary to ports or offshore terminals. They must communicate their 
intention to do this to IMO.  
 
The IMO approved the new global timetable for accelerating the phase-out of single 
hulled tankers at the MEPC 46th meeting in April 23-27, 2001. The new timetable was 
a result of the Erika accident and the MEPC 46th meeting was even re-scheduled so 
that the revised regulation 13G would enter into force at the earliest possible time 
permitted under the MARPOL 73/78. Therefore, the 2001 amendments entered into 
force on September 1, 2002. The EU member states indicated that they would make 
use of paragraph 8(b) and would deny port entry to single hulled tankers beyond 2015. 
 
The draft agreement to Annex I brought in a new global timetable for accelerating the 
phase-out of single-hull oil tankers. The timetable would see most single-hulled oil 
tankers eliminated by 2015 or earlier. Double-hull tankers were seen to provide 
greater protection of the marine environment from pollution in certain types of 
accidents. All new oil tankers built since 1996 are required to have double hulls. 
 
3.5.3 EU Regulation 417/2002 
Subsequently, the EU adopted Regulation 417/200280 on February 18, 2002, 
concerning the phasing-out of single-hulled tankers and it entered into force on 
September 1, 2002. The regulation reflected the changes made to the MARPOL at the 
46th MEPC meeting. The new Regulation implemented the same phase out schedule 
as the amendments to regulation 13G of Annex I of MARPOL 73/78. Further, 
Regulation 417/2002 identified the three different categories of tankers as had been 
introduced according to the revised Regulation 13G 
The purpose of Regulation No. 417/2002 was “to establish an accelerated phasing-in 
scheme for the application of the double hull or equivalent design requirement of the 
MARPOL 73/78 Convention to single hull oil tankers and to ban the transport to or 
from ports of the member states of heavy grades of oil in single hull tankers.”81 It 
                                                 
80 Regulation (EC) No 417/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 Feb 2002 on the 
accelerated phasing-in of double hull or equivalent design requirement for single hull oil tankers and 
repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 2978/94. 
81 Article 1 of Regulation 417/2002. 
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applies to oil tankers of 5,000 dwt and above entering into a port or offshore terminal 
of a member state, irrespective of their flag of flying the flag of a member state. 
 
The difference between the revised Regulation 13G and Regulation 417/2002 was that 
the EU Regulation did not allow “the continued operation, in accordance with 
paragraph 5 of revised Regulation 13G of Annex I to MARPOL 73/78, of Category 
(2) and Category (3) oil tankers under the flag of a Member State” or “the entry into 
the ports of offshore terminals under the jurisdiction of a Member State of other 
Category (2) and Category (3) oil tankers, irrespective of the fact that they continue to 
operate under the flag of a third State in accordance with paragraph 5 of revised 
Regulation 13G of Annex I to MARPOL 73/78.”82
 
3.6 Post-Prestige actions 
On November 13, 2002, the Prestige, a tanker of 81,564 dwt, carrying a cargo of 
77,000 tonnes of heavy fuel oil, suffered hull damage in heavy seas off northern 
Spain. She started drifting towards the coast but was eventually taken in tow by 
salvage tugs. Since neither Spain nor Portugal gave the Prestige a safe haven, the 
tanker was towed out into the Atlantic. The Prestige broke in two on November 19, 
after six days at distress, and the two sections sank some hours later in water two 
miles deep. In all, it is estimated that some 63,000 tonnes were lost from the 
Prestige.83 Owing to the highly persistent nature of the Prestige’s cargo, the released 
oil drifted for extended periods with winds and currents, travelling great distances. Oil 
came ashore in Galicia and later into the Bay of Biscay affecting the north coast of 
Spain and the Atlantic coast of France, as far north as Brittany. Some light and 
intermittent contamination was also experienced on the French and English coasts of 
the English Channel. Although oil entered Portuguese waters, there was no 
contamination of the coastline.84
 
The Prestige accident was another awakening for the EU and the IMO during the 
process of legislating on the phasing out of single hulled tankers. 
 
3.6.1 EU Regulation 1726/2003 amending Regulation 
417/2002 
In December 2002, following the sinking of the Prestige, the Commission proposed to 
accelerate the phase out scheme approved in 2001 to align it with the relevant phase 
out dates of the OPA 90. It was considered that single-hulled ships were the cause of 
significant pollution and that damage to the hull had the unavoidable consequence of 
spillage of the cargo into the sea. The European Parliament and the Council adopted 
on July 22, 2003, the amendment to Regulation 417/2002, by means of Regulation 
                                                 
82 Article 7 of Regulation 417/2002. 
83 www.itopf.org Case Histories, The Prestige. 
84 Ibid. 
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1726/2003.85 With the adoption of Regulation 1726/2003, the EU has since October 
21, 2003, applied rules that are as strict as the OPA 90 for the gradual phasing-out of 
single hull oil tankers.  
 
After a long debate between the fifteen member states, three fundamental changes 
were made to the existing Regulation 417/2002. Firstly, Category 1 oil tankers (Pre-
MARPOL tankers) were considered the most vulnerable ships since they are crude oil 
tankers of 20,000 dwt and above and oil product carriers of 30,000 dwt and above 
having no segregated ballast tanks in protective locations. They are generally 
constructed before 1982. The final date for the use of these oil tankers under new 
Regulation 1726/2003 was therefore brought forward from 2007 to 2005 and subject 
to an age limit of 23 years. The age limit was 28 years under Regulation 417/2002.  
 
Category 2 oil tankers (MARPOL-tankers) equipped with segregated ballast tanks 
protectively located and, therefore, provide greater protection against grounding and 
collision. They are generally constructed between 1982 and 1996. These tankers were 
to be withdrawn by 2010 according to the stricter timetable under Regulation 
1726/2003. The same timetable now applied to small, category 3 oil tankers. Category 
3 corresponds to single hull oil tankers below the size limits of categories 1 and 2 but 
above 5,000 dwt. These smaller tankers often operate in regional traffic.  
 
The new phase out schedule is as follows: 
 
Category of oil tanker Date or year 
Category 1 oil tankers of 20,000 dwt and 
above carrying crude oil, fuel oil, heavy 
diesel oil or lubricating oil as cargo, and 
of 30,000 dwt and above carrying other 
oils, which do not comply with the 
requirements for protectively located 
segregated ballast tanks (Pre-MARPOL 
tankers) 
2003 for ships delivered in 1980 or 
earlier, 
2004 for ships delivered in 1981, and 
2005 for ships delivered in 1982 or later. 
Category 2 oil tankers of 20,000 dwt and 
above carrying crude oil, fuel oil, heavy 
diesel oil or lubricating oil as cargo, and 
of 30,000 dwt and above carrying other 
oils, which do comply with the 
protectively located segregated ballast 
tank requirements (MARPOL tankers) 
and 
Category 3 - oil tankers of 5,000 dwt and 
above but less than the tonnage specified 
for Category 1 and 2 tankers  
2003 for ships delivered in 1975 or 
earlier, 
2004 for ships delivered in 1976, 
2005 for ships delivered in 1977, 
2006 for ships delivered in 1978 and 
1979, 
2007 for ships delivered in 1980 and 
1981, 
2008 for ships delivered in 1982, 
2009 for ships delivered in 1983, and 
2010 for ships delivered in 1984 or later. 
 
                                                 
85 Regulation (EC) No 1726/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 July 2003 
amending Regulation 417/2002 on the accelerated phasing-in of double-hull or equivalent design 
requirement for single hull tankers. 
 27
Secondly, the transport of heavy grades of oil such as crude oil, fuel oils, bitumen and 
tar was prohibited in single-hulled tankers. The ban applied to tankers of 600 dwt or 
more, with a transitional period for small ships with less than 5,000 dwt until 2008 
according to Article 4 section 5. The heavy grades of oil chosen are heavy fuel oil, 
heavy crude oil, waste oils and bitumen and tar. When spilt into the sea the heavier 
oils behave differently from lighter grades of oil. Due to their low volatility and high 
viscosity (resistance to flow), heavier oils evaporate slower than lighter grades and 
hardly dissolve. Therefore, these oils tend to remain in slicks and degrade only very 
slowly and can cause severe ecological damage to the ecosystems of the marine and 
coastal environments. In contrast, accidents involving spills of lighter oils may result 
in atmospheric pollution whilst lighter grades evaporate and pollutes the 
atmosphere.86
 
Thirdly, the transportation of heavy grades of oil (HGO) in single hull tankers, to or 
from the ports of an EU member state, is furthermore prohibited with immediate 
effect.  
 
The presidency of the Council and the Commission informed the IMO of the calendar 
in accordance with Article 211 (3) of the UNCLOS. The accelerated single-hull 
phase-out proposal to amend provisions of the MARPOL 73/78 was discussed on 14-
18 July, 2003. This proposal to amend MARPOL 73/78 was submitted by the EU 
member states and called for further acceleration of the phase-out timetable for single-
hulled tankers and an immediate ban of carriage of heavy grade oil in single-hulled 
tankers.87 The EU member states wanted to have their standards adopted at the 
international level. The EU wanted to work in co-operation with the IMO and 
suggested that its standards become global standards through further amendments to 
Annex I.88 Amendments were expected to be taken during a special session of the 
MEPC in December, 2003, in London. Under MARPOL 73/78 rules, the new 
standards will not come into force until 16 months after they have been adopted, 
which would be in April 2005.  
 
The EU now focused on the international arena. While waiting for a decision at the 
MEPC meeting in December, the Commission continued with concluding bilateral 
agreements with countries close to the EU, since given that the new MARPOL 73/78 
amendments would not enter into force until 16 months after their adoption,.89
 
                                                 
86 COM(2002) 780 final Proposal for a regulation amending Regulation No 417/2002 on the 
accelerated phasing in of double hull or equivalent design requirements for single hull oil tankers and 
repealing Council Regulation 2978/94. 
87Thébault, Lucie. Maritime Safety Culture in Europe, Managerial Law, Volume 46, Number 1, 2004, 
p. 21. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Single Hull Oil Tankers Banned from European Ports from 21 October 2003, IP/03/1421, Date: 
21/10/2003. 
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3.6.2 The 2003 amendments to 13G and a new 
regulation 13H 
Following the adoption of Regulation 1726/2003 in July, 2003, the EU submitted a 
proposal to the IMO to make amendments to Annex 1 of MARPOL 73/78. The 
proposal was circulated to the IMO member states for their consideration at the 
MEPC 49th meeting, so that the meeting could decide whether to hold an additional 
meeting in December, 2003. This in order to give the IMO member states the 
minimum six month period to consider the proposed amendments.90  
 
The MEPC 49th meeting held extensive discussions in plenary in relation to the 
proposals to amend MARPOL 73/78. The proposals were submitted by all, at that 
point, fifteen member states of the EU, and they called for further acceleration of the 
phase-out timetable for single-hull tankers. The outcome of the discussions was that 
the MEPC meeting agreed on an accelerated phase-out for Category 1 tankers, so-
called pre-MARPOL tankers. This would bring forward the final phasing-out date for 
these tankers to 2005, from 2007. The MEPC 49th meeting discussed the proposal to 
bring forward the phasing-out of category 2 and 3 tankers, so-called MARPOL 
tankers and smaller tankers, to 2010, from 2015. While there was substantial support 
in principle to the 2010 deadline, there was also concern relating to the phase-out of 
tankers of less than 20 years old in 2010 that this would lead to. There was a 
suggested proposal, for further consideration in December of 2003, which could see 
the operational life of these tankers extending to 2015 or until the ship reaches a 
specified age.  
 
The MEPC 49th meeting considered the proposed draft regulation on the carriage of 
HGO in single-hull tankers, which would ban the carriage of HGO in single-hull 
tankers. The MEPC agreed on the need for further technical discussion at the 
December meeting of the proposed new regulation 13H on Prevention of oil pollution 
when carrying HGO. In particular discussion was needed in relation to the physical 
properties of HGO, including their definition, in relation to density and/or kinematic 
viscosity, and in fighting pollution. 
 
The MEPC 50th meeting adopted an amendment to Regulation 13G of MARPOL 
73/78 Annex I that accelerated the phase out of single hull tankers and a new 
regulation 13H, similar to EU Regulation 1726/2003, on the carriage of HGO.  
 
Under a revised regulation 13G of Annex I of MARPOL 73/78, the final phasing-out 
date for Category 1 tankers (pre-MARPOL tankers) was brought forward to 2005, 
from 2007. The final phasing-out date for category 2 and 3 tankers (MARPOL tankers 
and smaller tankers) was brought forward to 2010, from 2015. The amended 13G 
phase out schedule was kept from the proposal put forward by EU member states and 
Regulation 1726/2003. The regulation would apply to oil tankers of 600 dwt and 
above carrying HGO as cargo regardless of the date of delivery. The regulation would 
not apply to double hull tankers complying with regulation 13F or regulation 
13G(1)(c).  
                                                 
90 EU Countries Propose MARPOL Amendments in Prestige Response, IMO News, No. 2, 2003, p. 6. 
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The revised Annex I of MARPOL 73/78 provided for a number of exceptions that 
were not dealt with in EU Regulation 1726/2003. For example, flag states could 
exempt oil tankers operating exclusively in regional trades from the phase out regime. 
The revised regulation allowed the flag state to permit continued operation of 
category 2 or 3 tankers that were fitted with double bottoms or double sides, which 
were not used for the carriage of oil and extending to the entire cargo tank length or 
double hull spaces, and that did not meet the minimum distance protection 
requirements. The flag state could allow continued operation beyond 2010, if the ship 
was in service on July 1, 2001. Again, such continued operation must not go beyond 
the date on which the ship reaches 25 years of age after the date of its delivery. 
 
A flag state could also allow continued operation of a single hull oil tanker of 600 dwt 
and above but less than 5,000 dwt, carrying HGO as cargo, if, in the opinion of the 
flag state, the ship is fit to continue such operation, having regard to the size, age, 
operational area and structural conditions of the ship, provided that the operation shall 
not go beyond the date on which the ship reaches 25 years after the date of its 
delivery. The flag state of a party to the MARPOL 73/78 may also exempt a tanker of 
600 dwt and above carrying HGO as cargo if the ship is either engaged in voyages 
exclusively within an area under the flag state’s jurisdiction, or is engaged in voyages 
exclusively within an area under the jurisdiction of another party, provided the party 
within whose jurisdiction the ship will be operating agrees.  
 
A party to MARPOL 73/78 is entitled to deny entry of single hull tankers carrying 
HGO which have been allowed to continue operation under the exemptions mentioned 
above, into the ports or offshore terminals under its jurisdiction, or deny ship-to-ship 
transfer of HGO in areas under its jurisdiction except when this is necessary for the 
purpose of securing the safety of a ship or saving life at sea. The EU member states 
announced that they would not make use of those exemptions and that the single hull 
tankers from countries benefiting from them would not be allowed to operate from or 
to EU member states’ ports. 
 
A new MARPOL 73/78 regulation 13H on the prevention of oil pollution from oil 
tankers when carrying HGO banned the carriage of HGO in single-hull tankers of 
5,000 dwt and above after the date of entry into force of the regulation (5 April 2005), 
and in single-hull oil tankers of 600 dwt and above but less than 5,000 dwt, not later 
than the anniversary of their delivery date in 2008. Under the new regulation 13H, 
HGO means any of the following: 
 
a) crude oils having a density at 15ºC higher than 900 kg/m3; 
b) fuel oils having either a density at 15ºC higher than 900 kg/ m3 or a kinematic 
viscosity at 50ºC higher than 180 mm2/s; 
c) bitumen, tar and their emulsions. 
 
At the same time, the 50th MEPC meeting also adopted a resolution urging member 
states to implement the new regulation 13H to ships flying their flag as soon as 
possible, preferably as from January 1, 2004. However, no states made any 
commitment to the resolution at the MEPC 50th meeting and it is not clear if the 
resolution will have an impact on early implementation of regulation 13H. Denial of 
entry should not be included in this early implementation. 
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The amended regulation 13G and the new regulation 13H entered into force on April 
5, 2005 and the new phase out schedule is as follows: 
 
Category of oil tanker Date or year 
Category 1 - oil tankers of 20,000 dwt and 
above carrying crude oil, fuel oil, heavy diesel 
oil or lubricating oil as cargo, and of 30,000 
dwt and above carrying other oils, which do not 
comply with the requirements for protectively 
located segregated ballast tanks (commonly 
known as Pre-MARPOL tankers)  
 
5 April 2005 for ships delivered 
on 5 April 1982 or earlier 
Anniversary date in 2005 for 
ships delivered after 5 April 
1982 
Category 2 - oil tankers of 20,000 dwt and 
above carrying crude oil, fuel oil, heavy diesel 
oil or lubricating oil as cargo, and of 30,000 
dwt and above carrying other oils, which do 
comply with the protectively located 
segregated ballast tank requirements 
(MARPOL tankers) 
and 
Category 3 - oil tankers of 5,000 dwt and 
above but less than the tonnage specified for 
Category 1 and 2 tankers  
 
5 April 2005 for ships delivered 
on 5 April 1977 or earlier 
Anniversary date in 2005 for 
ships delivered after 5 April 
1977 but before 1 January 1978 
Anniversary date in 2006 for 
ships delivered in 1978 and 1979 
Anniversary date in 2007 for 
ships delivered in 1980 and 1981 
Anniversary date in 2008 for 
ships delivered in 1982 
Anniversary date in 2009 for 
ships delivered in 1983 
Anniversary date in 2010 for 
ships delivered in 1984 or later 
 
3.6.3 Revision of Annex I of MARPOL 73/78 
The MEPC 51st meeting gave final approval to the revised texts of MARPOL 73/78 
Annex I with a view to adoption at MEPC 52nd meeting in October, 2004, with an 
expected entry into force date of January 1, 2007. Annex I was updated and included 
amendments adopted in recent years. It incorporated the various amendments adopted 
since MARPOL 73/78 entered into force in 1983, including the amended regulation 
13G, which now is regulation 20 in the revised annex, and regulation 13H, now 
regulation 21 in the revised annex, on the phasing-in of double hull requirements for 
oil tankers.  
It also separates, in different chapters, the construction and equipment provisions from 
the operational requirements and clarifies the distinctions between the requirements 
for new ships and those for existing ships. The revision provides a more user-friendly, 
simplified Annex I. The revised text of Annex I was adopted on October, 2004 at the 
52nd MEPC meeting. 
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3.6.4 EU Regulation 2172/2004 
On December 14, 2004, an amendment91 to Regulation 417/2002 was adopted since 
some of the references to Annex I to the MARPOL 73/78 had to be updated in the 
regulation due to the above revision of Annex I.  
 
                                                 
91Commission Regulation (EC) No 2172/2004 of 17 December 2004 amending Regulation 417/2002 
on the accelerated phasing-in of double-hull or equivalent design requirement for single hull tankers. 
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4 The possible consequences for 
the shipping industry 
4.1 The newbuilding market 
The phasing out of single hulled tankers is supposed to have a positive outcome on 
employment since the new double hull tonnage will increase the demand of new 
buildings. A couple of unfortunate tanker accidents in 2004 will mean stronger 
pressure for an even faster phase-out of single-hull tankers. The phase-in pace of 
double hull tankers up to and including 2007 is, however, about the maximum that the 
shipyards can deliver. That fact, along with the reducing average age of the fleet 
which is already down to 12 years, means that fleet renewal is more likely to slow 
down than speed up.92
 
There is still a lot of tonnage that is trading that is banned from trading with HGO to 
and from EU ports. Since April 5, 2005, many of these are also banned from trading at 
any ports in IMO countries. Large scale scrapping is thus forecasted. The ordering of 
oil tankers in the 2004-2008 period is forecast at 1,115 tankers, which is 117 less 
tankers than in the previous five-year period. Together with the large orderbook this 
means deliveries of 1,224 tankers until the end of 2008. This is 362 oil tankers more 
than in the previous five-year period.93
 
There appears to have been a great deal of conversion of Category 1 tankers to 
protectively located segregated ballast tanks (Category 2) which will give them up to 
three years extra trading.94 Looking at the graphs below, single-hull tanker phase-out 
will not have any significant market impact before towards 2010, when the EU and 
the US ban single hulled tankers. Also the MARPOL regulations that are subject to 
extensions granted by flag states and subject to acceptance by port states give states 
more flexibility on when to phase out single hulled tankers.95  
 
Under the international MARPOL regime, only Japan and Singapore have declared 
that they will accept single hulled tankers between 2010 and 2015 until they are 25 
years old. Australia has announced that it will not allow single hulls after 2010 and 
will not allow single hulls to enter with HGO after April 5, 2005, when the latest 
changes to MARPOL enter into force. The major oil exporters Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, 
Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates have not ratified MARPOL as well as 
Thailand and a number of African countries. This might result in that banned single 
hulled tankers will start trading in the waters of these non-ratifying countries. 
 
 
                                                 
92 http://www.intertanko.com/about/annualreports/2004/1_2.html, Annual Review. 
93 Shipping Markets Forecasts, Issue No. 8, March 2005, Lloyd’s Register Fairplay, p. 6.  
94 http://www.intertanko.com/about/annualreports/2004/1_2.html, Annual Review. 
95 http://www.intertanko.com/about/annualreports/2004/1_2.html, Annual Review. 
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Phase out per segment - number96
 
 
 
Phase out per segment – million dwt97
 
 
 
The tanker owners are likely to see an increase in maintenance costs. Double hull 
tankers are made up of almost double the steel and it will need to be taken care of to 
avoid corrosion of ballast tanks due to salt water. This has been an issue of discussion 
during the development of the IMO and EU regulations. Tanker owners know that if 
adequate maintenance is not made, a double hull may be worse off than an old single 
hull tanker. Corrosion may lead to leakage in the hull, which can result in inert gases 
in the ballast tanks. These may explode and put the crew at great danger.  
 
                                                 
96 http://www.intertanko.com/about/annualreports/2004/1_2.html, Annual Review. 
97 http://www.intertanko.com/about/annualreports/2004/1_2.html, Annual Review. 
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4.2 The freight market 
The sector in the shipping industry that most likely will be most affected by the phase 
out are tanker owners that are operating oil tankers to and from and between the ports 
of the EU in order to import, export, and distribute oil and oil products within the EU. 
The EU regulation phase out addresses all oil tankers above 600 dwt, regardless of 
their flag, when they operate to, from, and between the ports of the member states. 
Companies operating oil tankers will have to phase out their single hulled tankers 
according to the EU or the IMO regulations depending on whether they are a member 
state of the EU or not. If a company is registered in an EU member state, the 
exemptions according to the IMO regulation are not applicable since all EU member 
states have announced that they will not make use of the exemptions. A company 
registered in a state that only follows the IMO regulation may continue trading with 
its Category 2 and 3 tankers as long as until 2015 if the flag state allows this.  
 
Shipping companies with new and modern tonnage will be in a better competitive 
position than companies with old single hulled tankers will be. The oil companies, 
afraid of liability due to oil spills and the gigantic fines and expenses that follow, are 
demanding safe tonnage to transport their oil to the refineries. Unfortunately, there are 
still sub-standard tankers trading since there are states that have not signed the 
MARPOL 73/78 and therefore will not have to phase out their single hulled tankers. 
These tanker owners may offer cheaper services on the spot market for oil companies 
that are willing to take the risk to let their oil travel in second class. 
 
Crewmembers of the new, more advanced double hull tonnage will have to be better 
qualified to be able to safely operate the new tankers. Therefore, highly skilled 
crewmembers will be likely to be well prepared for a more demanding shipping 
industry. Companies investing million of dollars in new tonnage will want the best 
crew on their tankers. 
 
The phasing out of single hulled tankers will most likely have a positive effect on 
preventing future oil spills. This will give the shipping industry a better reputation for 
taking care of the environment. 15,000 tonnes of oil is estimated to be the amount 
spilled in 2004, compared with 42,000 tonnes in 2003 and 67,000 tonnes in 2002. The 
worst year of oil spilled was in 1979, when 640,000 tonnes were spilled into the 
oceans and the Atlantic Empress alone spilt 287,000 tonnes.98 2004 was the year with 
the lowest amount of accidental oil spilt from tankers since records started in 1978.99
 
It is interesting to look at the amount of oil spilled in the U.S. since the phase out of 
single hull tankers began with the OPA 90. It is clear, according to the graph below, 
that there was a huge decrease after the OPA 90 was adopted even though the number 
of spills increased. This means that most oil spills were small in comparison with 
earlier spills when a few spills amounted to tens of thousands of tonnes.  
 
 
                                                 
98 The Scandinavian Shipping Gazette, 22 April, 2005, p. 7. 
99 http://www.intertanko.com/about/annualreports/2004/1_2.html, Annual Review. 
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US Ship Spills 1973-2000100
 
 
 
It is also obvious, according to the graph below, that both the number of spills and 
tonnes spilled have decreased during the period 1968-1997. After an all time high in 
1979, the year of the Atlantic Empress, the occurrence of accidents have steadily gone 
down with a few exceptions. 
 
Estimated annual spills of tankers world wide101
 
 
 
When legislation is passed that decreases the number of accidents, the tanker owners 
are not subject to fines, damages, and clean-up costs as they would have been in the 
case of an accident. Even though new tankers demand large investments, tanker 
owners are more willing to invest in safe and clean tankers than having their name 
associated with an accident involving a huge oil spill. 
 
                                                 
100 Lentz, S. A. Felleman, F. Oil Spill Prevention: An Active Approach, International Oil Spill 
Conference, 2003, p. 4-5. 
101 Ibid. 
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Also oil companies are more and more demanding safe tankers since the Exxon 
Valdez, when the oil company Exxon was involved, and the Erika, when TotalFina 
was the subject of the outraged public. No company wants bad publicity and 
especially not oil companies that deal daily with the scare of an accident with their 
name involved. 
4.3 The sale and purchase market 
The newbuilding prices for oil tankers larger than 60,000 dwt have fallen slowly but 
the surge on the market, the high steel prices, and the queues at the yards have given 
an upturn since 2003. Expectations are that prices will stabilise in 2005 due to 
aggressive Chinese pricing.102 Due to the hot oil tanker market, the owners want new 
tankers immediately so the second hand prices of tankers have risen.103  
 
4.4 The demolition market 
The MARPOL and EU regulations accelerating the phase out of single hull oil tankers 
will lead to more ships being scrapped in particular in 2010. Future scrapping 
volumes of up to 16 million light displacement tonnage (LDT)104 in the peak year of 
2010 are much higher than the highest recorded scrapping volumes with a mean 
annual scrapping volume in year 1994 - 2003 of 4.7 million LDT and a maximum, 
recorded in 1999, of 6.4 million LDT. The total fleet of single hulled tankers of 5,000 
DWT and more made up about 2,256 ships or 129.5 million DWT as of January, 2004. It 
is estimated that the accelerated phase out scheme may lead to a peak volume of scrap in 
2010 of up to 16.7 million LDT. This is 25-30% higher compared to the estimate of the 
peak volume of 2015 for the MARPOL 13G regulation. The single hull oil tankers are 
estimated to account for 11.0 million LDT.105
 
The worst case scenario assumes that none of the exemptions possible under the IMO 
regulation is used. This is in practice probably not going to happen since for example 
a number of major flag states, Panama, Liberia, Bahamas, Brazil, India or Russia, are 
likely to apply for such exemptions. The theoretical peak in phase out volume will 
probably be lower and distributed over several years.106
 
The current capacity to meet the phase out demand is found in the developing countries 
where the scrapping industry is located. The predicted future scrapping volumes are 
considerably higher than the mean annual and maximum scrapping volumes recorded 
above, but there is no historical evidence of capacity constraints in the industry. Thus, if 
the future ship breaking is to be carried out under the present conditions governing the 
industry in Asia, it may be expected that the demand for scrapping capacity can be met.107
                                                 
102 Shipping Markets Forecasts, Issue No. 8, March 2005, Lloyd’s Register Fairplay, p. 6. 
103 Shipping Markets Forecasts, Issue No. 8, March 2005, Lloyd’s Register Fairplay, p. 6. 
104 This is when the tanker is built with nothing in it. 
105 European Commission Directorate-General Energy and Transport, Oil Tanker Phase Out and the 
Scrapping Industry, June 2004, p. 15. 
106 Ibid, p. 147. 
107 Ibid, p.9. 
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5 Closing comments 
5.1 Conclusion 
According to the UNCLOS, the EU has certain identified possibilities to act 
unilaterally as long as the EU member states use the jurisdiction given to them by the 
UNCLOS. The jurisdiction of flag and port states are required to prevent single hulled 
tankers from registering in the EU as well as ban them from trading to and from EU 
ports. Coastal state jurisdiction is weaker and, therefore, the EU regulation uses the 
jurisdiction of flag and port states that each EU member state is given by the 
UNCLOS.  
 
After a series of accidents with large amounts of oil spilt, the IMO and the EU have 
implemented legislation to prevent future oil spills. After the Exxon Valdez the US 
introduced double hull requirements and the IMO did the same in 1992. The EU did 
not react until the Erika accident when the EU politicians saw the need to prove their 
competency to act vigorously. The EU and IMO have, since then, taken every other 
step in the process of developing schemes to phase out single hulled tankers. The EU 
has obviously been pressuring the IMO to tighten the MARPOL in order to have a 
uniform regulation internationally. The IMO amended, after political pressure from 
the EU member states, Annex I of the MARPOL so that the single hull phase out 
scheme would be similar to the EU regulation. Although the MARPOL give some 
exemptions that flag and port states may use in order to let Category 2 and 3 tankers 
trade for a longer period, the MARPOL and EU regulations are essentially the same. 
 
The shipping industry will see many consequences due to the single hull phase out. 
Mainly, there will be a reduction in tonnage since tankers will be phased out. This 
tonnage will have to be replaced by new double hulled tankers. The shipyards and 
scrapping industry are expecting excellent years until the single hull tonnage is 
replaced by double hull tankers. Also the sale and purchasing market will see higher 
prices on second hand double hulled tankers since the demand for new tankers is high 
and the ordering books at the shipyards are full. 
 
5.2 Reflections and future studies 
The alertness of the shipping industry following a marine disaster has been a 
phenomenon ever since the sinking of the Titanic. On several occasions, a tragic 
accident has brought up a number of safety issues and the Erika and the Prestige 
incidents created a new climate in which the public is increasingly intolerant of any 
failure on the part of the maritime industry. The maritime community is acting faster 
than before in order to bring into force new legislative measures and restore the 
confidence in the system again.  
 
The IMO was after the Erika challenged to take immediate action. The EU was 
threatening to take unilateral action and, thereby, threatening IMO’s legislative 
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supremacy in matters concerning maritime safety and pollution prevention. States 
have recognized that shipping is a pre-eminently international activity that needs 
regulation at the international level and as a result the IMO has been a successful 
organization.  
 
The relationship between the IMO and the EU has become much more tense and 
difficult as a result of the sinking of the Erika and the Prestige. In both cases the 
European Commission made proposals that went far beyond the MARPOL 
amendments. The European Commission was inclined to do so due to, among other 
reasons, the considerable pressure from the European Parliament and particularly, on 
the Erika, from the French and, on the Prestige, from the French and Spanish 
politicians and people. The result of the two organizations different ways to regulate 
on this area has been the growth of a new order. According to this new order the EU 
will decide what it wants before demanding the same from the IMO. The underlying 
threat is that if the other members of the IMO do not agree, the EU will make its own 
regulations. The European Commission justifies this by quoting the example of the 
US. This means that the EU ignores the fact that that they open the door for other 
unilateral agreements. The benefits of an international body like the IMO may be lost 
and, in the long term, the shipping industry will always benefit from any legislation 
designed on an international basis. 
 
It is difficult to know how long the relations between the IMO and the EU will 
continue like this. As mentioned above, the recent accidents of the Erika and the 
Prestige have led to a strong pressure on the EU institutions from the concerned 
member states to create unilateral agreements to protect the EU from more 
environmental disasters and hence increasing the risk for conflict with international 
legislation. The fact that the EU has been triumphant with getting the IMO to phase 
out single hulled tankers at the same speed as the EU will probably increase the 
chances that the EU will continue to pressure the IMO to enforce the kind of maritime 
legislation that the EU is in need of.  
 
What will happen in the future when a double hull VLCC collides and breaks both 
hulls as it leaves the port of Marseilles? What will the reactions of the EU member 
states be and what will be the next move by the EU or the IMO? Will there ever be a 
triple hull or an age limit on tankers?  
 
As mentioned above, the shipping industry is one of the most international industries 
there is and as such, it needs to be regulated at the international level. The EU has 
walked its own path and forced the IMO to set stricter rules. The members of the 
European parliament are under pressure to prove to the voters that they have the 
possibility to respond quickly. The experts of the IMO are not in the need to prove 
this ability; instead they look for a long term solution that does not have to satisfy 
voters’ needs.  
 
For a future study it would be interesting to investigate how the phasing out of double 
hull tankers affected the shipping industry in the end. Also, further studies of how the 
IMO and EU relations will develop would be of interest since the EU has been 
successful in its efforts so far. Will the IMO take the legislative supremacy back from 
the EU or will the EU increase its legislative power in the maritime field?  
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